In Stuart England, there was no clear-cut legal precedent for deposing monarchs who abused their power. Little legitimate ground existed for disobeying kingly will. The spiritual consecration of kings, and incontestability of leadership, remained largely viable according to widely-accepted political theory advocated by absolutists. Reigning as supreme rulers over their kingdoms, sovereign leaders stood unrivalled by any other person, agency, or aggregate of authority which existed in their realms. At the same time, the possibility of removing tyrannical leaders, as well as other subcategories of necessary martial strife, was in the process of acquiring precedence in political writings and modernizing the study of international law to such a degree that it served to entirely transform the discipline. Issues of rightful leadership fell increasingly under the rubric of legal inquiry. The transitional state of jus in bello during the seventeenth century--the absence of specifically juridical example which served to sanction the recourse to king-killing--heralds the occasion for Milton's impassioned endorsement of resistance and right of rebellion in The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates and Eikonoklastes. In his examination of the relationship between sovereignty and the law, the poet advocates the possibility of resistance against a king who does not benefit the individuals over whom he rules, whose monarchical leadership attempts to surpass the legal limits of appropriation in its usurpation of selves and reason. " [L]ook how great a good and happiness a just king is, so great a mischeife is a Tyrant; as he the public father of his Countrie, so this the common enemie," 1 Milton observes. Driven by his selfish interests, such a king reigns for himself and his own agenda. He fails to
acknowledge that he "holds his autoritie of the people, both originaly and naturally for their good in the first place, and not his own" (3: 206, italics mine). Throughout the ages, the poet seeks to demonstrate in The Tenure of Kings, Greeks and Romans, Jews and Christians alike responded to criminally-behaved sovereigns by putting them to death (3: 212-16) .
In this essay, I seek to explore how Milton's pro-regicidal tracts support an evolutionary notion of kingship, and in doing so strive to shift the balance from a concept of monarchical rule in which the differentiation between adequate versus criminal leadership is largely inconsequential to one in which the quality of sovereign leadership matters. The language with which Milton radically re-envisions the relationship between power and the law is supported by leading organizing principles of the newly-evolving field of international law during the 1600s which accentuated the perpetuation of a societal organization consonant with the powers of human rationality, as well as man's ability to comprehend that society's well-being was contingent upon adherence to certain rules. His paradigm for rightful rulership is predicated on his optimism that battle kept within reasonable juridical limits could be used as a necessary tool for implementing political and social reform.
Most specifically, I wish to demonstrate, Milton's adherence to the natural law-based theories of the Dutch scholar Hugo Grotius, popularly known as the father and founder of international law, is essential to understanding the poet's representation of the relationship between monarchical rule and the law in The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates and Eikonoklastes. As a leading proponent of just / unjust martial theory during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Dutch scholar perceived lawful recourse to battle as an instrument of rational, civilized men, essential to protecting mortal society. Developing his notion of the state of nature from Aristotelian and Stoic models, Grotius maintained that individuals are motivated by the understanding that society functions in harmony with human nature. He sought to confirm that this position of sociability serves as the foundation of all law--natural law, deriving from God, and civil law, arising from man-made legislation--which originates from society. Seeking to prove that the separation between the law of nature and its materialization into positive law could remain exceedingly narrow, he demonstrated that humanly-derived law could elucidate the laws of nature--that legal positivism could promote a more genuine or "natural" natural law--more naturally progressing in association with mortal experience. In this way, the Dutch scholar concluded that ideal standards of justice could be integrated into the man-made laws by which individuals lived their lives.
The poet's well-known encounter with Grotius occurred during his journey to Paris in 1638-9. Milton "ardently desired" (Second Defense, 4: 615) this meeting, as the Dutch scholar's sociability theories were generating more and more notice in England at that time. J.M. Evans has noted that "In May or June of 1638 Milton visited the Great Dutchman in Paris on his way to Italy. Soon after his return to England he began work on the dramatic drafts of Paradise Lost, of which the four versions preserved in the Trinity MS. date roughly from 1639 to 1642." 2 The poet makes reference to Grotius in passages of his works which advocate theories, derived from the laws of nature, regarding individual integrity and the supremacy of human rationality such as In his treatise on legitimate versus criminal warfare, Grotius identified two foremost and mutually interactive arenas of justice which are based upon sociableness, founded upon man's inherent predilection for common society--legal principles deriving from divine or eternal sources, and positive laws originating from man-made legislation. Since the former is imperceptible to mortal insight, a "bridge" between the two systems is established so that humanly-fabricated law may correlate to God's law. In order to guarantee this association, sixteenth and seventeenth century jurists referred back to ancient models for their interpretation and representation of the laws of nature. Recognition of the vital link between divine equity and man's perception was to be identified in the evolution from Socratic origins of natural law in fifth century B.C. to Aquinas's incorporation of faith and reason eight centuries later.
Functioning as that aspect of divine law which man can perceive via the powers of his rational consciousness, natural law furnishes norms for justice, inspiring man to embrace virtue and avoid vice. As a determinative specifier for individual action, "[natural law acts as] a barometer by which people must adapt their worldly laws to come as close as possible in a fallen world to enacting and obeying divine law." 4 It measures the extent to which man can recapture and behave in conformity with standards of prelapsarian ideals in his motives and actions.
Confirming that the laws of nature and of nations continuously interact with one another--that positive, man-made law perpetually strives to pattern itself according to exemplary, divinelyderived natural law--Grotius demonstrated that humanly-fabricated law is informed by, and seeks to correspond with, natural law's evaluative standards.
Significantly, Grotius's contention that legal and ethical standards may coincide over an expansive terrain is inherent to his prioritization of the laws of nature. As Lloyd Weinreb notes:
The simplest deontological argument for natural law is based on the claim that, notwithstanding the examples of immoral laws, there is a correspondence between laws and morals. Law's very nature, it is claimed, impresses on it a minimum moral content. There is a moral floor, below which nothing that is properly regarded as law falls.
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Never forsaking its foundation in morality, natural law fulfills the distinctive claim that there are legitimate normative principles to which legal measures--if they are to remain valid and verifiable--ought to conform. Standards of conduct based on adequate ethical intention are thus, in theory, secured. In this way, natural law claims to be able to designate principles of practical right-mindedness, as well as conditions of consistency among men and in individual behavior.
The important point to be made is that the laws of nature seek to ethically interpret positive law. They furnish an "evaluative criterion" for legal positivism by providing "a standard of identity, justification, and evaluation for positive law." In all circumstances, a monarch must proceed in accordance with what his subjects have rationally determined to be "in service" to the public benefit.
The fact that states held no privileges which the individuals within them had not previously held, in their respective minds, served to restrict monarchical power.
According to Grotian standards of justice and injustice, Milton argues that the ability to eliminate a king who does not work to the ends of the common good--who retards or contradicts community interests and "transgresses against the laws and the state" notes that "from the very onset of his reign, Charles had worked to make himself an absolute ruler, worked with a resolution that 'all the Machiavells in the world' could not match." 16 By the late 1630s, many of his fellow countrymen openly accused him of pursuing an absolute prerogative, of using "powers which he possessed pro bono publico, for the public welfare, pro bono suo, for his own benefit". 17 Charles maintained that he could raise money without formal as proof that war against reigning sovereigns and magistrates--not just magistrates of whom the majority approved--was officially prohibited. Regal authority, they maintained, was not an aggregate of human authority shared among the masses and assembled under a single leader;
rather, it occasioned a participation in divine omnipotency. In this way, it follows, those supporting Charles argued that those who resisted the King resisted God. The king, they contended, existed as a manifestation of God on Earth. From this perspective, Charles is not above the law, or beyond it. He is both accountable to law and its foremost administrator. He is, in fact, the opposite of the immune and inalienable entity his Royalist defenders make of him--he is the law's servant. It is noteworthy that Milton reduced the King's legitimate role in politics to that of "chief executive," enlisted to do little else than execute the decisions of Parliament in a timely manner. 24 Milton's justification for defensive resistance against this avoidance and deformity of law is distinctively Grotian. "Most true is the saying," the Dutch scholar had cautioned in his
Prolegomena to De Jure Belli ac Paci, "that all things are uncertain the moment men depart from the Law" (17) . 25 Employing the language of justice and reason of state, the poet appeals to his conviction that "the Law of nature justifies any man to defend himself, eev'n against the King in Person" (3: 254) in reference to necessary preservation of the commonwealth. This is the point at which battle commences for Milton--the critical point, emphasized by Grotius-- In violation of this aspect of sociability, Milton believes, Charles strove to perpetuate an amorphous social whole subjected to his convoluted rationality. The King's measures to usurp the essential selves of his subjects, to appropriate that which existed as their subjects' suum 
